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“It is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say
what the law is.” 1 Justice Marshall set the stage in 1803, and, since the passage of
the Sherman Antitrust Act2 in 1890, courts in the United States have taken
Marshall’s sentiment to heart, bending and twisting antitrust law in every
direction. 3 The courts have not spared antitrust law with respect to sports leagues, 4
and their treatment has been anything but consistent. 5 Virtually every sports
league has seen its share of antitrust challenges and inconsistent rulings.
The National Football League (“NFL”) has been defending against antitrust
suits for over fifty years. 6 From draft disputes 7 to suits from outside leagues, 8 it
has grown accustomed to, and weary of, defending itself against a continuing
barrage of lawsuits by groups who are forum shopping for the most favorable
circuits. 9
The most recent chapter of NFL antitrust liability has arisen out of a lawsuit
over officially licensed NFL merchandise. Prior to 2001, the NFL had many
vendors for its officially licensed apparel. However, in 2001, for multiple reasons,
the NFL signed a $250 million, exclusive ten-year contract for Reebok to produce
on-field apparel for all thirty-two teams. 10 One of the NFL’s former vendors, hat
manufacturer American Needle, filed a lawsuit in the Federal District Court for the
Northern District of Illinois, claiming that the NFL had violated sections 1 and 2 of
1

Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177 (1803).
Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1–2 (2006).
3
ROBERT H. B ORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX: A POLICY AT WAR WITH ITSELF ix–x (1993).
Judge Robert Bork speaks of a Crisis in Antitrust, based on the inconsistencies in law—some cases
leading to the preservation of competition and others to its suppression. This constitutes the foundation
for the title of his famous 1978 work, The Antitrust Paradox. However, in his new edition in 1993,
Judge Bork has acknowledged that the law has improved, noting that “[i]t is merely law, not a farrago
prima facie amorphous and leftist political and sociological propositions.” Id.
4
See Gregory J. Pelnar, Antitrust Analysis of Sports Leagues 63 (Oct. 12, 2007) (working paper),
available at papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1021365.
5
Joseph P. Bauer, Antitrust and Sports: Must Competition on the Field Displace Competition in
the Marketplace?, 60 TENN. L. REV. 263, 264 (1993). In fact, Major League Baseball has the benefit of
a complete statutory exemption from the Sherman Act, while other sports remain subject to the Act in
varying degrees of rigor. See also Fed. Baseball Club of Baltimore, Inc. v. Nat’l League of Prof’l
Baseball Clubs, 259 U.S. 200 (1922).
6
See, e.g., Am. Needle Inc. v. Nat’l Football League, 538 F.3d 736 (7th Cir. 2008); Brown v. Pro
Football, Inc., 518 U.S. 231 (1996); Chi. Prof’l Sports Ltd. v. Nat’l Basketball Ass’n (Bulls II), 95 F.3d
593 (7th Cir. 1996); Sullivan v. Nat’l Football League, 34 F.3d 1091 (1st Cir. 1994); McNeil v. Nat’l
Football League (McNeil II), 790 F. Supp. 871 (D. Minn. 1992); Copperweld Corp. v. Independence
Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752 (1984); L.A. Mem’l Coliseum Comm’n v. Nat’l Football League, 726 F.2d
1381 (9th Cir. 1984); Mid-South Grizzlies v. Nat’l Football League, 720 F.2d 772 (3d Cir. 1983); Nat’l
Football League v. N. Am. Soccer League, 459 U.S. 1074 (1982) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); N. Am.
Soccer League v. Nat’l Football League, 670 F.2d 1249 (2d Cir. 1982); Smith v. Pro Football, Inc., 593
F.2d 1173 (D.C. Cir. 1978); Radovich v. Nat’l Football League, 352 U.S. 445 (1957).
7
Smith, 593 F.2d at 1183. Smith found, under the rule of reason analysis, that “the NFL draft as it
existed in 1968 had a severely anticompetitive impact on the market for players’ services, and that it
went beyond the level of restraint reasonably necessary to accomplish whatever legitimate business
purposes might be asserted for it.” Id.
8
N. Am. Soccer League, 670 F.2d at 1249.
9
Brief of Respondents at 4 for Writ of Certiorari, Am. Needle Inc. v. Nat’l Football League, No.
08-661 (Nov. 17, 2008).
10
MARK Y OST, TAILGATING, SACKS, AND SALARY CAPS: H OW THE NFL BECAME THE MOST
SUCCESSFUL SPORTS LEAGUE IN H ISTORY 129–30 (2006).
2
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the Sherman Act. 11 By 2008, American Needle Inc. v. National Football League
had worked its way to the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals. 12
Throughout this case, the NFL has asserted a single entity defense. Section 1
of the Sherman Act states, in part, that “[e]very person who shall make any
contract or engage in any combination or conspiracy hereby declared to be illegal
shall be deemed guilty of a felony.” 13 This language ultimately requires multiple
actors; common sense would say that a company cannot engage in a conspiracy
with itself. 14 Unfortunately, common sense does not always abound in antitrust
jurisprudence 15—for a long time it was possible to have a conspiracy within the
same entity under the intra-enterprise conspiracy doctrine. The single entity
defense, which relies on this common sense argument, has become more popular
since the passage of Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., the case that
abolished the intra-enterprise conspiracy doctrine. 16
In the American Needle litigation, the NFL contends that the “[l]eague and
its member clubs are, or at least function as, a single entity and therefore cannot
constitute the plurality of economic actors required for a [s]ection 1 conspiracy.” 17
The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals sided with the NFL; in affirming the holding
of the Northern District of Illinois, the court held that “NFL teams are best
described as a single source of economic power when promoting NFL football
through licensing the teams’ intellectual property, and we thus cannot say that the
district court was wrong to so conclude.”18 American Needle filed a petition for
certiorari to the United States Supreme Court, and, after asking the Acting Solicitor
General to file a brief expressing the views of the United States, 19 the Supreme
Court granted certiorari on June 29, 2009. 20
Scholars have been debating the application of the Sherman Act to sports
leagues for decades, and this Article adds to the debate by suggesting the proper
course of action the Supreme Court should take in the American Needle case. Part
I of this Article outlines the unique structure of the NFL as a sports league and the
structure of its official licensing program for merchandise. 21 Part II discusses the
basics of antitrust law and its application to sports leagues. 22 Part III outlines the
11
Am. Needle Inc. v. New Orleans La. Saints, 385 F. Supp. 2d 687, 689 (N.D. Ill. 2005)
(dismissing the case under a per se analysis).
12
538 F.3d 736 (7th Cir. 2008).
13
Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2006). Section 1 of the Sherman Act addresses
conspiracy while section 2 addresses monopolies.
14
See discussion infra Part III.B and note 164 and accompanying text.
15
See BORK, supra note 3, ix–x (referencing the chaos in the earlier days of antitrust
jurisprudence).
16
467 U.S. 752, 777 (1984) (holding that a parent corporation and its wholly-owned subsidiary
are “incapable of conspiring with each other for purposes of [section] 1 of the Sherman Act”).
17
Brief of Respondents, supra note 9, at 2.
18
Am. Needle Inc. v. Nat’l Football League, 538 F.3d 736, 744 (7th Cir. 2008), cert granted, 77
U.S.L.W. 3326 (U.S. June 29, 2009) (No. 08-661).
19
Am. Needle, Inc. v. Nat’l Football League, 129 S. Ct. 1400 (2009).
20
Am. Needle, 538 F.3d at 736. As of the date of publication, the Court had not yet set a date for
oral argument in the case.
21
See infra Part I.
22
See infra Part II.
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jurisprudential rollercoaster of cases pertaining to the single entity status of sports
leagues. 23 Part IV discusses the details of the American Needle case against the
NFL. 24 Part V culls the vast amount of scholarly work on this topic into a
cohesive argument, confirming the Seventh Circuit’s holding that the NFL is a
single entity. 25
I. STRUCTURE OF THE NFL AND ITS LICENSING APPARATUS
A. History and Structure
The NFL as we currently know it had a rocky start, plagued by problems of
rising salaries, the propensity of the best players to jump between teams for more
money, and the use of athletes who were still enrolled in college programs. 26 In
1920 a loose coalition of football teams joined together, to form the American
Professional Football Association, with Jim Thorpe as its first president. This was
an effort by these teams to agree to uniform rules and to address systemic problems
in football. The league, even then, was a necessary “cooperative venture” that at a
minimum allowed teams to determine scheduling, league rules, length of season,
and playoff structure. 27 In 1966, the NFL and the American Football League
(“AFL”) 28 were the two dominant professional football leagues, and they sought
and gained congressional approval for a merger which exempted their transaction
from antitrust liability. 29 The merger was not finalized until 1970, and today, there
is only one professional football league—the NFL—comprised of thirty-two
teams. 30 In 2004, the league generated $6 billion in revenue, and in 2006,
approximately $2.2 billion of the league’s revenue came from television alone. 31
In 2007, attendance at league games topped twenty-two million people for pre-,

23

See infra Part III.
See infra Part IV.
25
See infra Part V.
26
NFL.com, History by Decade: 1911–1920, http://www.nfl.com/history/chronology/1911-1920
(last visited Apr. 18, 2009).
27
Lee Goldman, Sports, Antitrust, and the Single Entity Theory, 63 TUL. L. REV. 751, 757–58
(1989) (noting that these items are really only the basic forms of cooperation, and the NFL franchise
members “exhibit significantly greater elements of cooperation”).
28
Id. at 757. With the exception of the AFL, every attempt at developing a competing league
failed. Id.
29
Pub. L. No. 89-800, § 6(b)(1), 80 Stat. 151 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1291 (2006)) (extending
“exemption from antitrust laws to include a joint agreement by which the member clubs of two or more
professional football leagues combine their operations in an expanded single league”); see Bauer, supra
note 5, at 267 (providing a more in-depth discussion of the antitrust implications of the NFL-AFL
merger). This is not the only time that the NFL obtained a congressional exemption from the Sherman
Act. Responding to United States v. Nat’l Football League, 116 F. Supp 319 (E.D. Pa. 1953), a
decision by the District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania finding that the NFL’s
broadcasting agreement violated the Sherman Act, Congress “agreed to confer a statutory exemption
not only on broadcasts of professional football games, but also on those of professional baseball,
basketball, and hockey” and passed the Sports Broadcasting Act. Bauer, supra note 5, at 270–71; see
15 U.S.C. §§ 1291–1295.
30
See MARK CONRAD, THE BUSINESS OF SPORTS: A PRIMER FOR JOURNALISTS 4 (2006).
31
Id. at 4–5.
24
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regular-, and post-season games. 32 Times have changed since the early days of the
NFL, and it is widely considered to be the “most financially sophisticated and
market-savvy league on the planet.”33 Currently, there are nineteen NFL teams
individually valued at $1 billion or more, with the Dallas Cowboys leading the
pack at $1.65 billion. 34 The NFL also has the widest fan base in the United States.
Among eleven sports tested in a 2001 Gallup survey, sixty-three percent of
Americans considered themselves fans of professional football. 35
The NFL is a unique entity in that its ultimate success depends on the
economic cooperation of its members, rather than the competition. 36 The NFL is
not a standard business but an unincorporated association, much like a trade
organization. 37 It has management authority that derives from an executive
committee composed of the league commissioner and one representative from each
team. 38 The NFL commissioner has a wide range of powers, including
“disciplinary powers, dispute resolution authority, and decision-making authority,
[which grants] the power to appoint other officers and committees.” 39
Additionally, the commissioner has the power to punish a player with fines (up to
$500,000), suspension, or banishment from the league. 40
The NFL has a great deal of control over its franchise members. The first
and most glaring example of this is the NFL revenue sharing structure. It was
devised in the 1960s when owner Art Model convinced other owners—George
Halas, Dan Reves, and Jack Mara—that revenue sharing would be good for the
competitive balance of the sport.41 Revenue sharing is also thought to prevent
undercapitalization of teams, which can cause harm to a team’s city, the league,
and the entire structure of the NFL. 42 Today, the NFL has the most equitable
revenue sharing agreement of all major sports leagues in the United States.
Currently, teams share ticket revenue with the home team receiving 60% of ticket
sales. 43 The NFL then pools the remaining 40% divides it among the member
clubs. 44 In 2004, total ticket sales reached $1.5 billion, and the NFL split $2.2
billion in television revenue among the member clubs. 45

32
NFL.com, NFL Sets Attendance Record in 2007, http://www.nfl.com/news/story?id=09000d5d8
077f84d&template=without-video&confirm=true (last visited Oct. 29, 2009).
33
YOST, supra note 10, at 122.
34
Special Report: NFL Team Valuations, FORBES.COM, Sept. 10, 2008, http://www.forbes.com/
lists/2008/30/sportsmoney_nfl08_NFL-Team-Valuations_Rank.html.
35
CONRAD, supra note 30, at 5.
36
Smith v. Pro Football, Inc., 593 F.2d 1173, 1194–95 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (MacKinnon, J.,
dissenting) (citing United States v. Nat’l Football League, 116 F. Supp. 319, 323–24 (E.D. Pa. 1953)).
37
CONRAD, supra note 30, at 4 (citing NFL CONST. and Bylaws, art. IV).
38
Id.
39
Id. (citing NFL C ONST. 3.1–3.9).
40
Id. (citing NFL C ONST. 3.1–3.9).
41
Id.
42
See Nathaniel Grow, Note, There’s No “I” in “League”: Professional Sports Leagues and the
Single Entity Defense, 105 MICH. L. REV. 183, 198 (2006).
43
CONRAD, supra note 30, at 12.
44
Id. at 4.
45
Id. at 4.
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Despite the delegated authority of the league, team owners maintain a great
deal of autonomy over the general operation of their teams. There is no common
ownership between NFL franchises; they are in a contract relationship with one
another under the NFL Constitution and Bylaws. 46 Teams have hiring and firing
prerogative, the ability to sign players (within salary cap restraints), and the ability
to sell tickets and to market their product to their community in an effort to gain
favorable publicity. 47
There are three models of sports team ownership rights. The first is a clubbased private property system consisting of little cooperation between the teams.
The second is a purely common property, league-based system that Major League
Soccer first attempted (it is thought that this does not work because people do not
want to be faceless investors in a sports franchise, and the fans want to see their
owners competing against each other). Finally, there is the mixed-mode property
system that blends positive benefits, recognizing that some cooperation is required
to make the system work, while respecting the fact that the fans do not want a predetermined outcome. The NFL falls into the third category. 48
The NFL Constitution and Bylaws connect each member franchise in a
unique structure of economic interdependence. 49 “For relevant economic
purposes, and thus antitrust purposes, separate ownership only entitles each
franchise owner to some share of the jointly generated league income, the amount
depending on the formula established by the member clubs acting collectively as
the league.” 50 Independent ownership is widely thought to be the best thing for the
league—it gives the fans confidence that the competition on the field is genuine—
translating this perception into ticket sales and television revenue for all of the
league members. 51
B. NFL Licensing and NFL Properties
NFL licensing revenue is a growing part of the NFL’s revenue stream,
albeit miniscule in comparison to its television revenue. The NFL merchandising
business generates approximately $3.5 billion per year in annual sales; however,
the NFL’s profit is only about 8–12% of the wholesale price of the items—diluted
when divided between thirty-two member clubs. 52 After operating expenses and

46

Goldman, supra note 27, at 757.
CONRAD, supra note 30, at 13.
48
Marc Edelman, Why the “Single Entity” Defense Can Never Apply to NFL Clubs: A Primer on
Property-Rights Theory in Professional Sports, 18 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 891,
891–905 (2008).
49
See Smith v. Pro Football, Inc., 593 F.2d 1173, 1194–95 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (MacKinnon, J.,
dissenting); Gary R. Roberts, The Single Entity Status of Sports Leagues Under Section 1 of the
Sherman Act: An Alternative View, 60 TUL. L. REV. 562, 576 (1986).
50
Roberts, supra note 49, at 576.
51
Grow, supra note 42, at 194 (citing Bulls II, 95 F.3d 593 (7th Cir. 1996)).
52
YOST, supra note 10, at 124; Grow, supra note 42, at 197 (citing Paul Doyle, Watch While You
Can; Lockout May End Careers, Franchises, HARTFORD COURANT, Oct. 8, 2003, at C8 (reporting that
NFL teams each receive $77 million a year from the NFL’s national television deal)); Gary Haber,
Trophy Won’t Alter Bucs’ Value, TAMPA TRIB ., Jan. 30, 2003, at 5 (“[NFL] owners derive most of their
revenue from a national television contract . . . .”); see also C ONRAD, supra note 30, at 271.
47
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taxes, it amounts to about $4 million per team each year. 53 Nevertheless, licensing
of logos for merchandising purposes is a large enough revenue generator that it
caught the attention of Pete Rozelle in the late 1950s. Rozelle, then head coach of
the Rams, thought he could make a great deal of money by correctly marketing
merchandise and licensing rights, so he hired the former marketing manager of
Roy Rogers, who had successfully earned the restaurant chain $30 million per year
in toy sales. 54 The Rams opened the first team store, which turned out be a
profitable venture. 55 Rozelle implemented this strategy league-wide when he
became commissioner in 1960.
Seeking to capitalize on the idea that licensees will pay money to use a logo
“on the belief that the team’s goodwill will enhance the appeal and perceived value
of the licensee’s goods,” 56 Rozelle founded NFL Properties (“NFLP”) in 1962.57
NFLP is a separate corporate entity designed to collectively promote the NFL’s
intellectual property and it is charged with “(1) developing, licensing, and
marketing the intellectual property the teams owned, such as their logos,
trademarks, and other indicia; and (2) ‘conduct[ing] and engag[ing] in advertising
campaigns and promotional ventures on behalf of the NFL and [its] member
[teams].’” 58 The teams authorized NFLP to grant licenses for all forms of
consumer products that might carry the logo of a team or the NFL itself, including
hats like the ones that American Needle Inc. produces. 59 An exclusive negotiating
agent like NFLP is a more efficient and collective mechanism than individual
teams negotiating every deal on their own. 60
The teams created NFLP, in its current form, in 1981 when twenty-six of the
then-existing twenty-eight teams entered into a trust agreement, transferring the
“exclusive commercial rights of their marks to the trustees of the NFL Trust.” 61
“The NFL Trust then enter[d] into a licensing agreement with NFLP, whereby
NFLP would act as the exclusive licensee of all of the NFL and team marks.”62
The NFL Trust then distributes revenue equally to the member teams. All four of
the major sports leagues in the United States use a trust model because it “requires
that any commercial enterprise, seeking to use any, or all, or some of the . . .
trademarks, license these trademark rights collectively from NFL properties, rather

53

YOST, supra note 10, at 136.
Id. at 123.
55
Id. at 122.
56
Brandon L. Grusd, The Antitrust Implications of Professional Sports’ Leaguewide Licensing and
Merchandising Arrangements, in THE BUSINESS OF SPORTS 183, 183 (Scott Rosner & Kenneth
Shropshire eds., 2004).
57
YOST, supra note 10, at 123.
58
Am. Needle Inc. v. Nat’l Football League, 538 F.3d 736, 737 (7th Cir. 2008) (alteration in
original). It is important to note that this intellectual property does not include the intellectual property
of the NFL players. The players, in conjunction with The NFL Players Association, have formed
Players, Inc. to represent the images of the players for video games, apparel, etc. CONRAD, supra note
30, at 271.
59
Am. Needle, 538 F.3d at 737–38.
60
Grusd, supra note 56, at 184.
61
Id. at 184–85.
62
Id.; CONRAD, supra note 30, at 270.
54
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than individually from specific football clubs.”63 This, in turn, makes it easier to
compete with other forms of entertainment. 64 Clearly the NFL member clubs are
satisfied with the NFL Trust because, in 2004, owners voted to extend the NFL
Trust for another fifteen years. 65
While the NFL Trust model has been successful, there are critics who
believe that it is not an efficient way to market for all league members. For
example, Brandon Grusd notes that there are four main reasons why the shared
licensing model, and all revenue sharing, is not efficient: (1) sharing merchandise
creates disincentives for owners to create competitive teams; (2) the plan
exacerbates the free-rider problem; (3) there is no incentive for inefficient teams to
exit the market; and (4) the teams promote a league product better individually
than they do as a league. 66 This analysis, however, does not account for the
collective benefit of having stronger teams throughout the league.
Critics maintain that the overall purpose of the trust model and collective
trademarking is to “reduce the level of competition in the merchandise license and
sponsorship markets between the teams within the same league.” 67 However, the
individual teams have not completely relinquished control over their marks.
Teams still retain:
(1) [T]he exclusive right to use its team marks in connection with the presentation
of a football game; (2) the nonexclusive right to use its team marks in local
advertising to promote football games; (3) the nonexclusive right to allow third
parties to use its team marks in advertisements in local sections of the team’s
program; and (4) the nonexclusive right to use its marks in its own
publications . . . . 68

Some teams, however, believe that they have more rights than others. Like
any good cartel, the model only works as long as all parties refrain from cheating,
and, if too many cheat, the whole system falls apart. 69
Of course, the cartel members who cheat are the most successful ones, and
this has shown to be true in the NFL. 70 In 1994, Jerry Jones, the owner of the
Dallas Cowboys, deviated from the NFL Trust and NFLP agreements and entered
into contracts with Nike and Pepsi. 71 That year, Jones’ Cowboys were responsible
for 30% of NFL merchandise sales and received only 3.6% of the revenue under
the sharing agreement. 72 Although the NFL and Jones traded lawsuits over this
matter, 73 they ultimately settled out of court.74 Proponents of the sharing
63

Edelman, supra note 48, at 920–21.
Id. at 921.
65
CONRAD, supra note 30, at 271 (citation omitted).
66
Grusd, supra note 56, at 186.
67
Id. at 185.
68
Id.; see also CONRAD, supra note 30, at 270.
69
Grusd, supra note 56, at 185–86; see also CONRAD, supra note 30, at xxiv (likening the NFL and
sports leagues in general to the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries).
70
Grusd, supra note 56, at 185–86.
71
Id.
72
Id.; see also YOST, supra note 10.
73
Timothy W. Smith, PRO FOOTBALL; Cowboy Owner Fires Back with Suit Against N.F.L.,
64
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agreements argued that the Cowboys are actually stronger because they are helping
to ensure the strength of all of the other teams. 75
C. Protecting the Value of Their License
In 1983, the offensive line of the Washington Redskins, known
affectionately as “The Hogs” because they averaged over 270 pounds each and
were virtually unstoppable, orchestrated a profitable enterprise around their huge
success. 76 The Hogs formed Super Hogs Inc., and, after the Redskins won the
Super Bowl in 1983, Super Hogs Inc. sold more than $500,000 worth of
merchandise. 77 This served as a wakeup call to the NFL that it needed to keep
track of its brand and control its distribution in order to maintain the successful
profit-sharing structure that made the league so successful. 78
In the mid-1990s, the NFL started trimming down its number of licensees. 79
In 1996, as a result of the Atlanta Olympics, as well as from apparel producers like
Polo and FUBU, there was a huge glut in the marketplace for logo apparel. 80
During this time, revenues decreased, and the NFL had over 350 licenses in the
marketplace. 81 The NFL hired Chuck Zona, a marketing expert, to help the league
streamline its brand because “[o]verlicensing . . . and oversupply put tremendous
pressure on profit margins.” 82 Under Zona’s lead, the NFL cut its licenses from
350 down to 125. 83
In 2002, the NFL took this streamlining to the next level by signing an
exclusive ten-year contract with Reebok for the right to produce all on-field
apparel for each of the thirty-two teams. 84 This deal has led to a much more
efficient marketing strategy for NFL apparel. 85 The unified look is good for the
brand, and the ten-year, exclusive contract allows Reebok to plan ahead in design
and solicit opinions from coaches, owners, players, and wives. Reebok designs
thirty items for each team with different clothing lines for different climates.86
A significant benefit of having fewer licenses in the marketplace is that it
allows the NFL to police its licenses much more carefully. It is easier for the

N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 7, 1995, at B11.
74
Pelnar, supra note 4, at 63. Under the settlement, Jones was able to maintain his licensing
agreement and enter into others. Additionally, in the Reebok deal, to which this Note is addressed,
Jones was the only owner who exercised his right to act as the sole private wholesaler, retailer, and
distributor of its own apparel. Id.
75
See Grow, supra note 42, at 194.
76
YOST, supra note 10, at 122–23.
77
Id. at 122.
78
Id.
79
Id. at 126.
80
Id.
81
Id.
82
YOST, supra note 10, at 126.
83
Id.
84
Id. at 128.
85
Id. at 130.
86
Id.
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league to identify and crack down on counterfeit NFL merchandise, and it gives
incentives to its license partners to police the marketplace as well.87
II. ANTITRUST LAW AND ITS APPLICATION TO SPORTS LEAGUES
A. General Principles
The purpose of antitrust law is to protect consumers by preserving and
ensuring competition in the marketplace. 88 The Sherman Act of 1890 has two
sections, each of which is designed to protect consumers from unreasonable
restraints of trade that might negatively impact the market. Section 1 of the
Sherman Act outlaws “every contract, combination . . . or conspiracy, in restraint
of trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations” 89 Section
2 of the Sherman Act states, in part, that “[e]very person who shall monopolize or
attempt to monopolize, or combine or conspire with any other person or persons, to
monopolize any part of the trade or commerce among the several States, or with
foreign nations, shall be deemed guilty of a felony.” 90 Section 1 applies to
multiple actors conspiring in restraint of trade, while section 2 can be applied to a
single firm acting to monopolize a product market.
At first glance, section 1 of the Sherman Act might seem to encompass
virtually all agreements or contracts; however, the courts have taken a different
approach to analyzing antitrust cases in light of this overly broad language. 91
Courts have determined that there are three ways of analyzing an antitrust claim,
and courts should choose which method to employ based on the nature of the
industry and the nature of the restrictive action. 92 The three methods are: (1) per
se; (2) rule of reason; and (3) a quick-look analysis. 93
In 1911, Justice White, in Standard Oil Co. v. United States, narrowed
section 1, generally applying it to unreasonable restraints of trade. 94 Justice White
went on to describe the notion of per se illegality; 95 though not coining the term,
he explained it in terms of restraint of trade that is inherently unreasonable. 96 Such
actions offer no significant prospect of consumer benefit 97 and are so heinous that
87
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Id.
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commerce in a necessary commodity.”); see also Michael A. Flynn & Richard J. Gilbert, The Analysis
of Professional Sports Leagues as Joint Ventures, 111 ECON. J. F27, F31 (2001).
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See United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F. 271 (6th Cir. 1898).
96
L.A. Mem’l Coliseum Comm’n v. Nat’l Football League, 726 F.2d 1381, 1387 (9th Cir. 1984)
(citing Standard Oil Co., 221 U.S. 1).
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the court, with proper experience, can “predict with certainty that the [further indepth analysis] will condemn that restraint[,] . . . [allowing the court to] hold that
the restraint is per se unlawful.” 98 In these situations, the court will find the action
per se illegal without any analysis into the possible benefits of the restraint because
they are considered “‘naked restraints of trade with no purpose except stifling of
competition.’” 99 Per se illegality is reserved for only the worst antitrust
offenses, 100 and, according to Justice Douglas, “[u]nder the Sherman Act a
combination formed for the purpose and with the effect of raising, depressing,
fixing, pegging, or stabilizing the price of a commodity in interstate or foreign
commerce is illegal per se.” 101
In 1918, in Chicago Board of Trade v. United States, Justice Brandeis
refined Chief Justice White’s opinion in Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey v. United
States, wherein Justice White announced a new approach to antitrust analysis, one
that requires a more exacting examination of the specific situation. 102 Justice
Brandeis held that “[t]he true test of legality is whether the restraint imposed is
such as merely regulates and perhaps thereby promotes competition or whether it is
such as may suppress or even destroy competition.” 103 Justice Brandeis calls for
consideration of the nature of the restraint, the history of the restraint, and the
reasons for and against a remedy. 104 He does not claim that a noble motive will
bless an otherwise illegal restraint, but rather that “knowledge of intent may help
the court to interpret facts and to predict consequences.” 105 This standard is
known as rule of reason, and it has become the classic approach that courts use in
antitrust analysis, most often when the court lacks “the expert understanding of an
industry’s market structure and behavior” sufficient to rule an act illegal without
further review. 106
In most circumstances, courts apply a rule of reason analysis, which requires
them to “decide whether under all circumstances of the case, the agreement
imposes an unreasonable restraint of trade.”107 Unless it is a thinly veiled cartel,
joint ventures and their ancillary restraints also fall under the rule of reason
analysis. 108
There is a third standard of antitrust analysis that courts occasionally apply:
quick look. This approach generally emanates from Chief Justice Burger’s
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dissenting opinion in United States v. Topco Associates, 109 refined in NCAA v.
Board of Regents110 where many turn for a general analysis. 111 A quick-look
approach requires the court to do just that. The court first makes an “initial
presumption that the restraint impairs competition,” then the court takes a quick
look at the justifications for the restraint. 112 If the court determines, based on the
quick look, that the justifications are legitimate,113 then the court engages in a
complete rule of reason analysis. 114
Based on the language in sections 1 and 2, there are certain exemptions to
Sherman Act liability, starting with the interstate commerce exemption. The
Sherman Act requires that the prohibited restraints occur in interstate commerce,
the origin of Congress’s authority to pass such a law. 115 If a court specifically says
that a restraint is not occurring in the course of interstate commerce, then such
action is exempt from the Sherman Act. 116 This is precisely how Major League
Baseball (“MLB”) was able to secure a complete exemption from antitrust liability.
In 1922, the Supreme Court determined that the business of baseball is a purely
state affair. 117
Another exemption to antitrust liability comes from a statutory exemption:
congressional approval. 118 This is the type of exemption that the NFL secured
when Congress approved the merger between the NFL and the AFL. 119 The most
important exemption for sports league analysis, and the focus of this Article, is the
single entity exemption. This exemption stems from the argument that conspiracy
under section 1 requires multiple actors and a single entity cannot conspire with
itself. 120
B. Consumer Welfare
Judge Robert Bork, in his paradigm work The Antitrust Paradox, takes the
Chicago School approach, espousing consumer welfare as the exclusive goal of
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antitrust law. 121 An in-depth analysis of the consumer welfare doctrine is beyond
the scope of this Article; however, at least a cursory understanding is imperative to
engage in antitrust analysis. Most scholars agree that the congressional record
does not give any insight into the Sherman Act’s purpose, but today most scholars,
including Judge Bork, espouse consumer welfare as at least one of the primary
goals of the Sherman Act. 122
Consumer welfare is an analytical model that can take multiple different
forms. Chief Justice White, in Standard Oil, couched it in terms of restriction of
output, 123 while others characterize it in terms of actual detriment to consumers of
goods and services. 124 According to Judge Bork, regardless of what one looks at,
be it statutes, legislative history, or court precedent, the overall purpose of antitrust
law is consumer welfare. 125
Professor Myron Grauer analogizes consumer welfare theory to the concept
of Pareto optimality: 126
Pareto optimality assumes that society contains limited resources, that consumers as
a whole desire as many goods and services as they can obtain at the lowest possible
price, and that producers desire to maximize profits. The goal of Pareto optimality
is to allocate society’s limited resources in a manner such that no rearrangement of
those resources (by judicial decree or otherwise) can make any one person better
off (or more satisfied) without making another person worse off. 127

Pareto optimality is not actually attainable because society is dynamic and
not static, but it is the role of antitrust law and the consumer welfare model to help
bring society as close as possible to this optimality. 128
Simply because the achievement of Pareto optimality is the ultimate goal,
that does not mean that every single transaction must be a “Parteto superior
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move.” 129 Grauer points out that to have a Pareto optimal transaction, the two
parties involved in the transaction must compensate any third parties affected for
any potential damage that might occur. 130 This is a trial-and-error approach that
requires a “long-run” view of consumer welfare rather than a transactional
analysis. 131 We should be concerned with the combination of multiple transactions
approaching Pareto optimality. Implying that the courts should not be involved in
“the actual efficiencies of particular practices in general,” nor should they consider
the “intent behind the internally determined practices of a single firm, unless it is
clear that firm has significant market power.”132 Where there is not significant
market power, thus not implicating section 2 monopoly restrictions, the courts
should let the market punish the single firms who are not acting overall in the
interest of consumer welfare. 133
This view of using consumer welfare maximization to approach Pareto
optimality is employed in this Article’s analysis from here forward.
C. Joint Venture Analysis
A joint venture “refers to a research, production, or marketing enterprise
created by several persons other than ordinary investors.” 134 The overall question
in joint venture analysis stems from the fact that “[a] joint venture is both an
economic actor in its own right and a collaboration of its participants.” 135 For the
purposes of this Article, I am concerned with whether to treat the NFL as a joint
venture of many owners of multiple businesses or as a single entity under antitrust
law. 136 Treating a league as a single entity removes it from the joint venture
discussion of section 1 liability. 137 For general purposes, the single entity is
appropriate for venture activities that do not govern members’ conduct, while a
continuing conspiracy designation seems wise for rulemaking activities. 138
When a joint venture is operating in the marketplace as an economic
participant, that joint venture is a single entity for antitrust purposes. 139 Joint

129

Id. at 76 n.22.
Id. (citing RICHARD POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 12–13 (3d ed. 1986)).
131
Id. at 78.
132
Id. (citing Frank H. Easterbrook, Comparative Advantage and Antitrust Law, 75 CAL. L. REV.
983, 985 (1987) (emphasis added)).
133
Id. (citing Easterbrook, supra note 132, at 985).
134
PHILLIP AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW ¶ 1478a (2d ed. 2003).
135
Werden, supra note 97, at 701.
136
See id.
137
Id.
138
AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 134, ¶ 1478a.
139
See Werden, supra note 97, at 705 (citing Arizona v. Maricopa County Med. Soc’y, 457 U.S.
332, 356 (1982) (“In . . . joint ventures, the partnership is regarded as a single firm competing with the
other sellers in the market.”)); Nat’l Football League v. N. Am. Soccer League, 459 U.S. 1074, 1077
(1982) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (“[T]he league competes as a unit against other forms of
entertainment.”); Bulls II, 95 F.3d 593, 600 (7th Cir. 1996) (“[T]he NBA is best understood as one firm
when selling broadcast rights to a network in competition with a thousand other producers of
entertainment, but is best understood as a joint venture when curtailing competition for players who
have few other market opportunities.”).
130

2009

NFL

111

ventures have the unique ability to combine their assets in a way that permits them
to act more efficiently, reduce costs, and, in some cases, generate and market a
product that, alone, none of the participants could have conceived of. In the same
way that joint ventures bring new opportunities, they are also very helpful in
pooling and, therefore, reducing risk to any single participant. 140
When a joint venture is not treated as a single entity, it is then nothing more
than a conspiracy between competitors to restrain the market, opening them up to
section 1 liability. 141 Courts should not analyze each individual joint venture
restraint of trade in isolation, but rather the courts should look to the relationship
between restraints. 142 It may be that one restraint, which on its face might seem
unlawful, is actually necessary to facilitate another restraint. 143
This is the concept of “ancilarity,” which dates back to 1898 when Judge
Taft, sitting on the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals, noted that:
[N]o conventional restraint of trade can be enforced unless the covenant embodying
it is merely ancillary to the main purpose of a lawful contract, and necessary to
protect the covenantee in the full enjoyment of the legitimate fruits of the contract,
or to protect him from the dangers of an unjust use of those fruits by the other
party. 144

An ancillary restraint is only legal if it is necessary to accomplish the
efficiency-enhancing goals of the joint venture. Thus, it is important to analyze the
agreement forming the joint venture, as well as all ancillary restraints, before
passing judgment on a single restraint. 145
An ancillary restraint can have many benefits that might help the joint
venture operate more efficiently. 146 It may prevent a single member from gaining
an unfair advantage over the others, it might prevent non-participants from
“appropriating joint venture benefits for which they have not shared costs,” or it
might prevent “unintended competitive consequences.” 147 Ultimately, restraints
within a joint venture cannot be judged in a vacuum, and courts should analyze a
restraint in light of “the factual context of each joint venture.” 148 This joint
venture analysis is exactly what the courts subject the NFL to each time they
determine that the league is not a single entity.
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III. JURISPRUDENTIAL TREATMENT OF SPORTS LEAGUES
A. Early Sports Antitrust Decisions
The question of whether and how antitrust law should apply to sports leagues
has never been answered in any clear and meaningfulway. In Radovich v. National
Football League, the Supreme Court first openly stated that antitrust laws do apply
to the NFL and that the NFL does not enjoy the same exemption as MLB. 149
Radovich was a conspiracy case in which the plaintiff alleged that the NFL
“entered into a conspiracy to monopolize and control organized professional
football in the United States, in violation of [sections] 1 and 2 of the Sherman
Act.” 150 The Court held that the NFL conducted a requisite volume of interstate
business to make it subject to the Sherman Act. 151 While Radovich did not
consider single entity status, it is important because the plaintiff in American
Needle places great emphasis on the Radovich holding. 152
As sports leagues began to assert a single entity defense for their restrictive
actions, an early case offered an indication that this defense could be successful.
In San Francisco Seals, Ltd. v. Nat’l Hockey League, the San Francisco Seals
hockey team sought to exchange its franchise with the one in Vancouver, but the
NHL Board of Governors denied the request. 153 In granting the NHL’s motion for
summary judgment, the court said that while the sports teams within the league
compete against one another, they are “not competitors in the economic sense in
this relevant market.” 154 They are, the court held, “all members of a single unit
competing as such with other similar professional leagues.” 155 The court stated
that this organizational scheme imposes no restraint on trade or commerce and
makes possible a segment of commercial activity that could not exist without the
league. 156 The San Francisco Seals court distinguished United States v. Topco
Associates, Inc., which found a coalition of twenty-five supermarket chains in
violation of the Sherman Act because they were engaged in illegal territorial
licensing activities. 157 The San Francisco Seals court noted that the NHL teams
are not economic competitors and their territorial restraints have no effect on trade
or commerce. 158 San Francisco Seals was short-lived a victory for sports
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leagues. 159
The single entity defense would not hold up long, and its acceptance soon
became the exception to the rule160—a trend beginning with North American
Soccer League v. National Football League. 161 The dispute in North American
Soccer League arose because of an NFL bylaw prohibiting cross-ownership
between NFL franchises and other professional sports franchises. 162 The NFL did
not want its owners to have an interest in any other professional sports leagues. 163
The North American Soccer League (“NASL”) sued the NFL alleging antitrust
violations. 164 The Second Circuit engaged in a lengthy conversation about the
structural nature of the NFL, concluding that NFL members participate jointly in
many operations but that “each member is a separately owned, discrete legal entity
which does not share its expenses, capital expenditures or profits with other
members.” 165 The court held that NFL franchises are “separate economic entities
engaged in a joint venture.” 166
The Second Circuit in North American Soccer League based its findings on a
line of cases that incorporate the intra-enterprise conspiracy doctrine, and it
reasoned that “[t]he theory that a combination of actors can gain exemption from
[section] 1 of the Sherman Act by acting as a ‘joint venture’ has repeatedly been
rejected by the Supreme Court and the Sherman Act has been held applicable to
professional sports teams by numerous lesser federal courts.” 167 After finding that
the NFL is a joint venture, not a single entity, the court analyzed the NFL’s
restriction on cross-sport ownership and found that the pertinent product market in
the case was entertainment products. As such, the NFL was in violation of the
Sherman Act for illegally “restricting the sources of capital for new sports leagues
and rais[ing] artificial barriers to entry.” 168
Justice Rehnquist wrote an important opinion when dissenting from the
Supreme Court’s denial of certiorari in North American Soccer League. Among
other arguments, he stated that the Second Circuit did not give enough weight to
the pro-competitive effects of the NFL’s cross ownership rule. 169 Justice
Rehnquist pointed out that while teams might compete on the field, they rarely
compete in the marketplace. He argued that the system of revenue sharing and the
joint negotiation for television contracts were persuasive proof that the NFL is a
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single entity. 170 He analogized this situation to the one in Broadcast Music, Inc. v.
CBS, noting that the NFL is an arrangement necessary to the production of
professional football. 171 Justice Rehnquist then applied the Broadcast Music
holding to the NFL:
The NFL, like ASCAP [The American Society of Composers, Authors and
Publishers], is “not really a joint sales agency offering the individual goods of
many sellers, but is a separate seller offering its [product] of which the individual
[teams] are raw material. [The NFL], in short, made a market in which individual
[teams] are inherently unable to compete fully effectively. 172

The next major case, continuing the trend the Second Circuit established in
North American Soccer League, is Los Angeles Memorial Coliseum Commission v.
National Football League. 173 The central question in this case was “whether a
professional sports league is a single entity joint venture beyond the scope of the
Sherman Act or merely an association of horizontal competitors.” 174 This case
arose out of the relocation of the Los Angeles Rams NFL franchise from the Los
Angeles Memorial Coliseum to another venue in Anaheim, California. The Los
Angeles Memorial Coliseum sought to lure in a different NFL franchise; however,
Rule 3.4 of the NFL Constitution and Bylaws required a three-quarters majority
vote to move a team, and, because this was still the same territorial market as the
Rams, the NFL declined a request for the Oakland Raiders to move to Los
Angeles. 175
The Ninth Circuit ruled against the NFL when it affirmed the district court’s
decision. 176 The district court found the NFL liable for its restrictive behavior for
three reasons: (1) if the court allowed the single entity exception, it would exempt
the NFL from all section 1 liability in all instances; (2) courts have found other
organizations with a similarly unitary product in violation of section 1; and (3) the
district court believed NFL clubs are separate business entities and any arguments
to the contrary are false. 177
In arriving at its conclusion that teams are not separate business entities, the
Ninth Circuit examined the differences in profits and on- and off-field competition.
The court dismissed the NFL’s revenue sharing model as evidence of anything,
choosing to focus on its profits and losses instead. 178 The court noted that profits
and losses are not shared; rather, they vary widely between the franchises. The
court also focused on the competition between the teams vying for the best
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coaching staff, personnel, and player talent. 179 L.A. Memorial Coliseum also
mentions the off-field competition between teams in the same market. These
teams, the court argued, compete for fan base, local television and radio revenues,
and media space. 180
But the Ninth Circuit’s single entity argument was flawed. As a part of its
single entity analysis, the court refuted the arguments that professional football is
unique to the NFL and that cooperation with the NFL is necessary to produce
professional football because, at the time, there existed the ill-fated United States
Football League that only lasted three seasons. 181 Furthermore, the court did not
apply Broadcast Music to demonstrate that sometimes collaboration is necessary to
distribute a unique product into the marketplace, as Justice Rehnquist had
suggested. 182 Rather, the L.A. Memorial Coliseum court simply used Broadcast
Music to demonstrate why it was engaging in a rule of reason analysis. 183
The Ninth Circuit ultimately found that relocating the Raiders would have
created competition with the Rams and that the NFL was attempting to “enforce an
agreement with one of [its] co-contractors to the detriment of that co-contractor’s
right to do business where he pleases.”184 The court recognized that the teams are
not true competitors, but this finding was not sufficient to avoid section 1 liability
for the NFL. 185
B. Copperweld and the Death of the Intra-Enterprise Conspiracy Doctrine
Until the Supreme Court’s 1984 decision in Copperweld Corp. v.
Independence Tube Corp., 186 courts could hold a parent corporation and its
subsidiaries in violation of section 1 on the “theory that incorporation created
legally separate entities” that were capable of conspiring with one another in
restraint of trade. 187 This was possible under the intra-enterprise conspiracy
doctrine, which posited that a single company can conspire with itself as long as
those it is conspiring with are separate incorporated entities. 188 This doctrine has
played an important role in shaping sports antitrust law, as both L.A. Memorial
Coliseum and NASL relied on it, at least in part. 189
Copperweld identified United States v. Yellow Cab Co. 190 as the root of the

179

Id.
Id. However, if there was not sufficient market demand for two teams, it is very unlikely that
NFL owners would have permitted more than one team in a single market. This argument goes to the
point of the revenue sharing model. It weakens the league when one team is financially weak. See
supra note 42 and accompanying text.
181
L.A. Mem’l Coliseum, 726 F.2d at 1387–88.
182
See supra notes 169–72 and accompanying text.
183
L.A. Mem’l Coliseum, 726 F.2d at 1389.
184
Flynn & Gilbert, supra note 94, at F34–35.
185
Id.
186
467 U.S. 752 (1984).
187
Horizontal Restraints, in 2-11 FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAW § 11.10 (2003).
188
AREEDA & H OVENKAMP, supra note 134, ¶ 1478.
189
Goldman, supra note 27, at 755.
190
332 U.S. 218 (1947) (wherein the defendant was the proprietor of multiple taxicab companies
180

116

BUSINESS, ENTREPRENEURSHIP, & THE LAW

Vol. III:I

intra-enterprise conspiracy problem because Yellow Cab held that an unreasonable
restraint “may result as readily from a conspiracy among those who are affiliated
or integrated under common ownership as from a conspiracy among those who are
otherwise independent.” 191 Yellow Cab stated that even restraints in a vertically
integrated enterprise were not outside the scope of section 1. 192
Copperweld then went on to criticize claims from previous courts that the
intra-enterprise conspiracy doctrine favored the substance of the agreement over
the form. The case argued that the intra-enterprise conspiracy doctrine draws an
artificial distinction at the expense of substance and that no other courts had
engaged in an in-depth analysis of the issue. 193 Copperweld went beyond looking
at the traditional form of the business structure, preferring to examine the
substance of the relationships and actions to determine if there are any threats to
competition. 194
Copperweld actually had a narrow holding195 but an important one that
abolished the intra-enterprise conspiracy doctrine. It held that “the coordinated
activity of a parent and its wholly-owned subsidiary must be viewed as that of a
single enterprise for purposes of [section] 1 of the Sherman Act,” because “a
parent and its wholly- owned subsidiary have a complete unity of interest.”196
Some argue, however, that Copperweld is not so narrow and actually contains dicta
indicating that “other purportedly joint activities might not involve the requisite
plurality of actors needed to implicate section 1.”197
The Copperweld court drew a perfect analogy that will prove useful—the
entities share a common interest, much like a team of horses drawing a vehicle
under the control of a single driver. 198 Furthermore, the court relied on the fact
that there is not a sudden joining of economic resources that had previously served
disparate interests. 199 Though sports leagues are not parent companies with teams
as their wholly owned subsidiaries, this case is an important step toward single
entity status for sports leagues.
C. Post-Copperweld Sports Decisions
It did not take long before courts were again slamming the door on sports
leagues, despite the fact that Copperweld had invalidated the intra-enterprise

that it had acquired in four different cities and was found liable regardless of the vertical integration of
his business); Copperweld, 467 U.S. at 760.
191
Copperweld, 467 U.S. at 760 (quoting Yellow Cab, 332 U.S. 218).
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conspiracy doctrine. 200 Courts chose to follow L.A. Memorial Coliseum,
distinguishing Copperweld because sports teams are not wholly-owned
subsidiaries. 201 The next case to address the single entity issue with respect to
sports leagues was McNeil v. National Football League (“McNeil II”), wherein
eight NFL players sued the NFL over a proposed wage scale that the NFL
presented to the NFL Players Association. 202
The NFL, in McNeil II, argued the single entity theory—espousing that it and
its clubs are incapable of conspiring because they are a single economic entity. 203
The NFL relied on the testimony of then-Commissioner Paul Tagliabue that the
NFL is not a relationship among competing clubs, but rather “co-owners engaged
in a common business enterprise, the production and marketing of professional
football entertainment.”204 But the McNeil II court immediately deferred to the
Ninth Circuit in L.A. Memorial Coliseum and the Second Circuit in North
American Soccer League to argue that there was nothing in the case, or in the
NFL’s argument, that distinguished it from the previous circuit court decisions. 205
The NFL, anticipating this decision, contended that L.A. Memorial Coliseum and
North American Soccer League are distinguishable because they were decided
prior to Copperweld. 206 However, the McNeil II court was quick to point out the
difference between a joint venture and the wholly-owned subsidiaries to which
Copperweld applied. 207 Moreover, the court dismissed the NFL’s arguments
regarding the uniqueness of its situation—that without collaboration, professional
football would not be possible—by relying on NCAA v. Board of Regents, wherein
the Supreme Court allowed the application of section 1 to the NCAA despite its
claim that its restraints were necessary to facilitate college football as a joint
venture. 208 NCAA acknowledged that horizontal restraints were necessary to
facilitate the game but still applied a rule of reason analysis, citing precedent
stating that “joint ventures have no immunity from antitrust laws.” 209 McNeil II
also noted that the Ninth Circuit in L.A. Memorial Coliseum was not deaf to the
argument that the teams must coordinate to produce professional football; McNeil
II acknowledged this, yet held that this cooperation was not enough to find that the
NFL is a single entity. 210
Two years after the District Court of Minnesota handed down its ruling in
McNeil II, the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed the joint venture
status of the NFL in Sullivan v. National Football League. 211 Sullivan was the
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790 F. Supp. 871 (D. Minn. 1992).
Id. at 878–79.
Id. (citing Declaration of NFL Commissioner Paul Tagliabue (Dec. 4, 1991)).
Id. at 879–80.
Id. at 880.
Id. at 879.
McNeil II, 790 F. Supp. 871, 880 (citing NCAA v. Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. 85 (1984)).
Id. (citing NCAA, 468 U.S. at 113).
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34 F.3d 1091 (1st Cir. 1994).
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former owner of the New England Patriots (the “Patriots”), a team with
outstanding public shares of ownership. 212 When joining the league, the NFL
owners voted to give Sullivan an exemption from the uncodified rule prohibiting
public ownership of teams. 213 In 1976, Sullivan purchased all of the outstanding
public shares, converting the Patriots into a privately held company. 214 However,
when Sullivan needed to raise capital in 1987, he sought to sell forty-nine percent
of the Patriots in a public offering of stock. 215 Sullivan ultimately never asked for
a vote from team owners on the proposal because a headcount showed that he
would not prevail. 216 When the NFL hinted that it would prevent the sale based on
its public ownership rule, Sullivan sued claiming it violated sections 1 and 2. 217
In Sullivan, the NFL again based its defense on Copperweld—that it is not
subject to section 1 liability because it is a single entity and Copperweld abolished
the intra-enterprise conspiracy doctrine. 218 But the First Circuit, citing McNeil II,
held that Copperweld did not apply in the instant case, nor did it apply to any other
cases involving the NFL. 219 In response, the NFL relied on Judge Arnold’s
comment in City of Mount Pleasant v. Associated Electrical Cooperative, Inc., 220
that the economic reality within a cooperative venture “will always” include
“varying interests” and coalitions that “come and go according to changing
conditions and the interests of the varying factions.” 221 The NFL argued,
referencing Judge Arnold’s opinion, that “the fact there might be varying interests
is immaterial if the economic success of the venture’s members ‘depends, and has
always depended, on the cooperation among themselves.’” 222
The Sullivan court disagreed and used the Mount Pleasant holding against
the NFL by pointing out the court’s emphasis on needing a unity of interest and
ensuring that the participants do not pursue interests that are contradictory or
divergent from those of the cooperative. 223 Mount Pleasant defined “diverse” as
“interests which tend to show that any two of the defendants are, or have been,
212

Id. at 1095.
Id.
214
Id.
215
Id.
216
See id.
217
Sullivan v. Nat’l Football League, 34 F.3d 1091, 1095–96 (1st Cir. 1994).
218
Id. at 1099.
219
Id. One student made a persuasive argument that Sullivan incorrectly applied Copperweld
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actual or potential competitors.”224 The NFL maintained that none of the teams
are competitors in the arena of team ownership interests, 225 but Sullivan deferred to
the jury’s finding that there was competition between the teams in this arena, citing
expert testimony and the testimony of some owners that there could be competition
with other teams for investment capital. 226 Sullivan also engaged in a discussion
about ancillary benefits and rejected the NFL’s contention that the public
ownership rule was necessary to the operation of the joint venture. 227
McNeil II and Sullivan seemed to foreclose any possibility that the NFL or
any sports league might prevail on a single entity defense in a section 1 case;
however, in 1996, the Seventh Circuit came to the rescue in Chicago Professional
Sports Ltd. v. National Basketball Association (“Bulls II”). 228 Amid the Chicago
Bulls’ reign as one of the best teams in basketball, the Chicago Bulls ownership
group went outside the National Basketball Association (“NBA”) telecasting
agreement and entered into its own agreement to televise forty-one extra Bulls
games nationwide via Chicago-based station WGN. 229 The NBA claimed that its
antitrust exception under the Sports Broadcasting Act permitted it to limit the
number of games and impose a tax on the Bulls for each additional game that was
nationally televised. 230 The Bulls sued the NBA for sections 1 and 2 violations. 231
The NBA conceded it was comprised of thirty entities (twenty-nine teams
and the NBA itself), each a separate corporation or partnership, but argued that it
was not liable for section 1 violations. 232 The NBA submitted that “it functions as
a single entity, creating a single product (“NBA Basketball”)233 that competes with
other basketball leagues . . . other sports, and other entertainment such as plays,
movies, opera, TV shows, Disneyland, and Las Vegas.” 234 The NBA contended
that the separate ownership increased competitiveness, which encouraged
franchises to field better teams and made the contests more exciting, thereby
strengthening the single product of NBA Basketball. 235 The court agreed with the
NBA, reasoning that the point of antitrust law is to encourage “cooperation inside a
business organization . . . [to] better facilitate competition between that
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organization and other producers.” 236
Bulls II took a broader approach to Copperweld, not seeing a narrow holding
that only applies to parent corporations and their wholly-owned subsidiaries. The
court found fault with the requirement for a “complete unity of interest” as stated
in Copperweld, calling it “silly” because “even . . . single firm[s] contain many
competing interests.”237 The Seventh Circuit instead interpreted Copperweld as
distinguishing between unilateral and concerted action and then “assign[ed] a
parent-subsidiary group to the ‘unilateral’ side in light of those functions.” 238 The
court continued that actions that “deprive[] the marketplace of the independent
centers of decision-making that competition assumes[,]” without the efficiencies,
accompany integration inside a firm, are considered concerted rather than
unilateral actions. 239 The court held that under this reasoning, courts can
determine that sports leagues are a single entity, noting that without the necessary
cooperation, “a league with one team would be like one hand clapping.” 240
Bulls II notes the difficulty of trying to categorize sports leagues as a single
firm or a joint venture under Copperweld because they have characteristics of both.
The court distinguished NCAA by noting that the professional leagues have no
purpose other than to produce a professional sport while colleges and universities
plainly have an alternate purpose of education. 241 The decision is also problematic
because perspective can lead to a very different opinion about the single entity
status of a league. For example, to Pepsi Co., the NBA likely looks like a single
entity marketing its professional basketball games, but to the starting point guard
playing for a Division I school looking to sell his skills, there is a competition for
human capital that makes the NBA look like a joint venture rather than a single
entity. 242 In exploring this conundrum, the Bulls II court noted the difficulty that
the Supreme Court had in categorizing the NFL in Brown v. Pro Football, Inc.243
Although the Supreme Court in Brown hinted that the NFL could be a single
entity, 244 it did not need to decide status to arrive at its holding in the case—merely
finding the NFL was more like a single bargaining employer rather than a multiemployer. 245
Bulls II is a good reference source because it points to all of the recent
jurisprudence on the single entity status of sports, noting that “most courts that
have asked [the question] . . . have preferred the joint venture characterization.”246
236
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The court considered Justice Rehnquist’s dissent from the denial of certiorari in
North American Soccer League 247 and also noted that the Fourth Circuit
determined that the Professional Golfers Association, a group similar to the NFL,
is a single firm for antitrust purposes, even though that firm is less economically
integrated than the NBA, therefore exhibiting fewer characteristics of a single
firm. 248 In the end, Bulls II determined that each sport is diverse in its own right
and should have its own single entity analysis. 249 Stopping there might make
sense; however, the court further stated that maybe the analysis should occur one
facet of one league at a time, either granting or denying a single entity designation
for each facet. 250 Yet the court ultimately remanded the case, not even applying its
own analysis to the NBA’s broadcasting rules. 251 Some have criticized the Bulls II
decision as adding nothing constructive to the national debate but rather further
muddying the water through its unnecessary dicta. 252
IV. AMERICAN NEEDLE V. NFL AND THE CURRENT DEBATE
Up until 2000, NFLP granted apparel licenses to many different companies,
including “American Needle, which held a license to make NFL headwear for
twenty years.” 253 “[I]n 2000, the NFL teams . . . [gave] NFLP the right to solicit
bids for exclusive licensing” and in 2001 Reebok’s winning bid was accepted, and
NFLP granted Reebok a ten year exclusive license. 254 Thereafter, NFLP did not
renew the licenses of other apparel manufacturers, including American Needle’s
headwear license. 255
“American Needle responded to the loss of its license by filing an antitrust
action against the NFL, NFLP, each NFL team, and Reebok” (collectively
“Defendants”). 256 American Needle claimed that the Defendants were in violation
of section 1 on the theory that “each of the individual teams separately owned their
team logos and trademarks, [and] their collective agreement to authorize NFL
Properties to award the exclusive headwear license to Reebok was, in fact, a
conspiracy to restrict other vendors’ ability to obtain licenses for the teams’
intellectual property.” 257 They also claimed a section 2 violation, reasoning that
the grant of an exclusive license to Reebok was in fact the NFL teams
monopolizing the NFL team licensing and product wholesale markets. 258
One year into the case, the NFL filed a motion for summary judgment on the
247
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section 1 claim, arguing that under Copperweld and subsequent cases, “they were
immune from liability under [section] 1.” 259 In affirming the district court’s
decision granting the motion, the Seventh Circuit explained that the Supreme Court
based its decision in Copperweld not on whether there was a problem with the
form of the relationship, but rather on whether the substance of the relationship
carried any anticompetitive260 risks and also on whether there was a unity of
interest in the form of a single corporate conscience. 261 The NFL relied on postCopperweld cases that have gradually extended Copperweld’s single entity
concept beyond the parent-subsidiary relationship to affiliated companies or
individuals. 262 The district court’s grant of summary judgment was based on the
NFL’s single-entity argument, relying primarily on Copperweld and Bulls II to
hold that “in answering Copperweld’s functional question, we believe cooperative
marketing does serve to promote NFL football and falls on the ‘unilateral’ action
side of the line.”263
The Seventh Circuit began its reconsideration of the district court’s decision
by pointing out the fact that it has never rendered a “definitive opinion as to
whether the teams of professional sports leagues can be considered a single entity
in light of Copperweld.” 264 The court then reiterated its conversation from Bulls II
about how difficult a decision this is and how it can really just depend on
perspective, 265 citing Bulls II for the proposition that a sports league could be
considered a single entity under Copperweld. In keeping with its “one facet of one
league at a time” analysis, the court limited its analysis to (1) the actions of the
NFL, NFLP, and the teams; and (2) “the actions of the NFL and its member teams
as they pertain to the teams’ agreement to license their intellectual property
collectively via [NFLP].” 266
In opposition, American Needle argued that the district court concluded the
NFL is a single entity because it acts as a single entity in licensing its products.
American Needle maintained that the district court, rather than inquire as to
whether the NFL was acting as a single entity, “should have inquired into whether
259
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the NFL teams’ agreement to license their intellectual property collectively
deprived the market of sources of economic power that control the intellectual
property.” 267 American Needle maintained that the court can answer this question
by looking to whether the teams compete with one another in the intellectual
property market. 268
The Seventh Circuit agreed with American Needle’s analysis of the proper
single-entity test, but it did not agree with how American Needle applied that test.
The court pointed out that Copperweld does not hold that only “conflict-free
enterprises may be single entities.”269 The court concluded that even though some
teams may, at times, have competing interests in the intellectual property market,
“those [divergent] interests do not necessarily keep the teams from functioning as a
single entity.” 270 Based on this decision, the court disassembled American
Needle’s claim that the NFL teams have deprived the market of independent
sources of economic power. The Seventh Circuit in American Needle pointed out
that NFL teams can “function only as one source of economic power when
collectively producing NFL football.”271 It naturally follows that only one source
of economic power controls the promotion of NFL football. The court stated that it
does not make sense to claim that each individual team is responsible for the
promotion of NFL football when they collectively produce it. 272 The court cited
the uncontradicted evidence in the record that NFL teams share a vital economic
interest in the promotion of NFL football and adopted the NFL’s argument that it
must compete with other forms of entertainment. 273 The Seventh Circuit found it
most compelling that since 1963 the teams have acted as one economic entity for
the purposes of licensing their intellectual property, and there has been no sudden
joining of economic power, as pointed out in Copperweld. In addition, American
Needle did not dispute the NFLP’s articles of incorporation, which state that the
teams formed the NFLP to “conduct and engage in advertising campaigns and
promotional ventures on behalf of the [NFL] and its member [teams].” 274 “Simply
put,” the court concluded, “nothing in [section] 1 prohibits the NFL teams from
cooperating so the league can compete against other entertainment providers.” 275
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V. ANALYSIS OF THE SINGLE ENTITY ISSUE AND ITS APPLICATION TO AMERICAN
NEEDLE
The question of whether coordination of professional sports teams harms
competition is the central economic issue in antitrust analysis. Thus, courts must
decide if coordination’s lessening of competition is offset by the benefits to
consumers from that coordination.276 As previously discussed, sports teams
demonstrate characteristics of both joint ventures and single entities; they are also
in the unique position of competing on the field to produce a product that would
not be possible without one another. This distinguishes sports leagues from other
joint ventures and has resulted in a different sort of treatment. 277
Initially, courts did not apply antitrust laws to sports leagues because it was
thought that such leagues were not engaged in interstate commerce—the basis for
the MLB exemption. 278 Although all other leagues remain subject to antitrust laws,
their conduct is often held to a lower standard. 279 One way in which the courts
treat sports leagues differently is that they typically assume that the leagues are
comprised of actual or potential competitors and then engage in a rule of reason
analysis. In fact, there are reasonable arguments to be made that the leagues are
enterprises that are not comprised of competitors and that their venture enables the
production of a product that would not otherwise exist. If the courts took this
perspective, then they would find that the leagues’ actions are presumptively procompetitive. 280 This is the foundation for the single entity argument.
Single entity status for sports leagues is an important issue for the leagues,
those with which they conduct business, and end-consumers of their products. The
true point is that section 1 does not prohibit anti-competitive actions by a single
entity; therefore, a single league, not conspiring with other leagues, can openly act
in a manner that unreasonably restrains trade and only section 2 might apply. 281
“By prohibiting only those restraints of trade imposed by ‘combination, contract,
or conspiracy,’ section 1 sets its focus clearly and exclusively on joint activity.” 282
This single entity question acts as a threshold issue that courts must address before
moving on to a traditional per se, rule of reason, or quick look analysis in a section
1 case. 283
Many contend that the unique nature of sports leagues leads to only one
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conclusion on single entity designation: it depends. Advocates and opponents of
the single entity designation for sports leagues almost all agree that, no matter the
conclusion, sometimes the leagues act as single entities and sometimes they act as
joint ventures. 284 Most courts, when asked the question of single entity
designations, choose joint venture; however, there are exceptions, and the total
field of jurisprudence on the matter is unclear—another indication that the mixed
approach might be appropriate for sports leagues. 285
The general question before us is whether or not courts should consider the
NFL a single entity in light of the fact that the teams are separate legal enterprises,
all part of a greater entity, co-producing subunits of a league, none capable of
generating any revenue on its own and each required to cooperate on many issues
in order to produce the league product. 286 This section will discuss and apply
public policy, the consumer welfare model, and the current case law to arrive at the
conclusion that the Supreme Court should uphold the Seventh Circuit’s decision in
American Needle. Furthermore, I predict that the Supreme Court will likely do so
in a narrow manner that will leave little resolution, thereby leaving Congress as the
only venue able to address this issue with the requisite finality to settle the current
inconsistencies among the circuits.
A. Social Policy Against Single Entity Status for the NFL
Of the scholarly work that addresses the single entity issue for sports
leagues, very little focuses on a public policy argument, apart from consumer
welfare. Some contend that allowing leagues, such as the NFL, to avoid section 1
liability would essentially be a slap in the face to the consumer, thereby violating
public policy. Marc Edelman, a professor of sports law and economics, argues that,
in light of the massive profits that sports leagues generate, it would be a “twisted
sense of irony if the unique property-rights system that has made professional
sports so profitable also were to provide them with a loophole to avoid complying
with antitrust principles.” 287 The North American Soccer League court also
commented on this would-be “loophole,” arguing that any possible restraint that
the NFL members enter into that might benefit the league or enhance its efficiency
will be outweighed by the anticompetitive effects. 288 The L.A. Memorial Coliseum
court mimics this sentiment, adding that this loophole would immunize the NFL
from any further scrutiny. 289
The notion that courts should not apply a law to a certain venture because of
seemingly absurd irony or an undesired loophole is not a persuasive argument.
Under a single entity designation, the NFL would simply be held to a different
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standard, as outlined in section 2 of the Sherman Act, and this standard would
remain applicable to all intra-league activities. 290 Furthermore, the league would
still not be insulated from section 1 if it conspired with other firms. 291 Preferring
not to label the NFL as a single entity because it seems unfair to hold such a
profitable enterprise to only section 2 liability is unpersuasive. Courts need to
apply the law consistently.. Courts are better off considering and weighing more
traditional factors like the purpose of antitrust legislation and the following
precedents.
B. The Consumer Welfare Argument in Favor of Single Entity
If the maximization of consumer wealth is the goal, then determining
whether a sports league is a single entity “turns on whether the actions of the
league have any potential to lessen economic competition” among each
individually-owned team. 292 Any examination of the propriety of a single entity
status for sports leagues is going to require knowledge of when “the joint activity
in question is efficient without being anticompetitive in the consumer welfare
sense.” 293
As previously discussed, the purpose of antitrust law is to protect consumer
welfare in an effort to strive toward Pareto optimality. 294 The question then
becomes: “[g]iven society’s limited resources, how can we simultaneously try to
satisfy the seemingly contradictory goals of consumers (the receipt of maximum
goods and services at the lowest possible price) and producers (the receipt of
maximum profits)?” 295 The debate over this question and the impact of a single
entity designation for sports leagues has been going on in academic circles for
more than thirty years. Three leading scholars on the subject have come to split
decisions. Both Myron Grauer and Gary Roberts believe that designating
professional sports leagues as single entities actually preserves consumer
welfare, 296 while Lee Goldman maintains that designating the leagues as joint
ventures does not compromise consumer welfare. 297 The following discussion will
briefly conclude the arguments of these three scholars, however, an in-depth
analysis of the consumer welfare doctrine and the surrounding economics are
beyond the scope of this Article.
According to Grauer, the consumer welfare analytical model posits that
courts should not interfere with the decisions or actions of a single entity that are
intended to make it operate more efficiently. 298 If an organization exists with the
290
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primary purpose of increasing its own efficiency, such as the NFL, the single entity
status is appropriate, and courts should not engage in a full inquiry into whether
any particular practice is designed to promote efficiency. 299 As previously
mentioned, not every action must be Pareto superior, and, based on Grauer’s
argument, the Supreme Court should designate the NFL a single entity and
preclude courts from dissecting every single transaction to locate a supposed
consumer welfare benefit. 300 Grauer continues to put faith in the free market to
rectify an inefficient action that the single entity takes. 301 He further argues that
any attempts at shoehorning the NFL into a joint venture designation, when it does
not satisfy the requirements, simply to find the requisite multiplicity of actors for a
section 1 action is nothing more than a misuse of the law in an effort to obtain
treble damages. 302
Roberts generally agrees with Grauer in that the question of whether to
designate the NFL as a single entity should not focus on a separate rule of reason
analysis for a particular practice. Rather, “it should rest on whether consumer
welfare is generally enhanced over the long run . . . by assuming that the
organization’s internal management decisions are adopted in furtherance of
organizational efficiency (which in turn maximizes profits).” 303 Roberts and
Grauer both believe that the single entity theory preserves consumer welfare over
the long run because, among other reasons, the member clubs are not and can
never be considered “natural competitors” and could not exist but for the
cooperation of the others. Because of this, “there is no consumer-welfareenhancing intraorganizational competition for the league to diminish.” 304
Lee Goldman does not agree with Grauer and Roberts; instead, he believes
that consumer welfare “is not sacrificed by recognizing teams’ independent
interests and rejecting a complete single entity defense.” 305 Goldman believes that
the teams are independent decision makers and that courts should engage in a rule
of reason review to determine if an action is an unreasonable restraint of trade in
violation of section 1. 306 He notes that the cooperative and interdependent aspects
of the league will entitle it to rule of reason analysis, and, under this standard, truly
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efficient action will not be sacrificed. 307 Goldman believes that a complete grant
of single entity paints with too wide a brush and would permit certain actions that
would not have withstood rule of reason analysis. 308
Goldman is obviously not in favor of complete single entity status as Grauer
and Roberts are, but he does acknowledge that the whole of the NFL is greater than
the sum of its parts and that the league members must make some decisions jointly
for the product of NFL football to exist. Goldman chooses to focus his analysis on
Copperweld’s great emphasis on legal control and “recognizes that an entity must
act through its agents, but [he] adheres to the well-established rule that conspiracy
is possible where the agent has an independent personal stake.” 309 Therefore, he
continues, courts should treat “some, but not many, league decisions as those of a
single entity.” 310
Goldman’s theory relies on a short-term perspective of consumer welfare,
while Grauer and Roberts posit that only a long-run view of consumer welfare
would tolerate the time required for a trial and error approach to lead society
toward Pareto optimality. 311 In fact, Grauer accuses Goldman of never actually
defining what he believes consumer welfare is, arguing that this lack of definition
makes it impossible to analyze the consumer welfare implications of the single
entity doctrine. 312
A complete analysis of the disagreements between these scholars and the
details of their arguments is ripe for its own article.. With this overview, I have
laid out merely a few particulars of their views toward consumer welfare in an
effort to shed some light on the current environment of the academic debate on this
issue.
C. Bringing It All Together
Determining whether to designate the NFL as a single entity in the American
Needle case requires reexamining NFL product licensing and its relevant product
market, determining whose theory of consumer welfare to accept, considering
whether to read Copperweld expansively or not, and analyzing previous Supreme
Court and lower court rulings on the matter. 313
1. The Supreme Court Should Consider Professional Football the
NFL’s Product Within the Entertainment Marketplace
Before being able to argue that the Supreme Court should affirm the Seventh
Circuit in American Needle, it is first necessary to determine the NFL’s relevant
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product and to determine if any of the teams that comprise the NFL are in
competition over the sale of this product. L.A. Memorial Coliseum states that the
definition of the entity impacts the nature of the product and the market;314
however, here it is necessary to find a single product before it is possible to find a
single entity.
NFL member teams are “inextricably bound in an economic sense, and must
adopt certain intra-league instrumentalities to regulate the whole’s ‘downstream
output.’ In the case of the member clubs, this ‘downstream output’ is professional
football, and the organ of regulation is the unincorporated, not-for-profit,
association commonly known as the [NFL].”315 There is virtually no practical
distinction between the league and the member clubs, except for independent
form. 316
Most scholars agree 317 that the “product of a professional sports league is
season-long competition involving hundreds of individual games among all of the
member clubs, leading to divisional or conference titles and, ultimately, to an
overall league championship.”318 Moreover, though they are at odds on the field,
these teams are not natural competitors, but rather partners “which could not exist
but for the complete cooperation of others.”319 Finally, the teams are not
competing in a marketplace for football; rather, the NFL is competing with its
product of professional football in the entertainment marketplace. 320 This common
purpose among the NFL member teams, to create and promote professional
football through the NFL, leads to another common purpose: “the maximization of
total league activity.” 321 This notion of maximization of league activity (profits)
carries through to its licensing activities. Though it is not a major percentage of
each team’s revenue, the teams do use this money to become stronger individual
enterprises, which allows them to field more talented teams—ultimately increasing
the quality of their end product, professional football.
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2. The Supreme Court Should Adopt Grauer and Roberts’ Consumer
Welfare Theory
I am most persuaded by Grauer and Roberts and their contention that an
organization exists with the primary purpose of increasing its own efficiency, such
as the NFL. The overall single entity status is appropriate, and courts should not
engage in a full inquiry into whether any particular practice is designed to promote
efficiency. Though Goldman makes a good point that some actions that would
otherwise be illegal under a rule of reason analysis would go unpunished, I take
comfort in the theory that not every single transaction must be a “Pareto superior
move.” 322
Surely, there will be some transactions that are more favorable than others,
and that is why a long-term approach will best suit consumer welfare rather than
the alternative, which is the unending costs and uncertainties that are inherent in
seeking a resolution over every transaction within the court system. 323 These costs
and uncertainties would inflict a far greater injury to the efficiency of the NFL and
consumer welfare than “any slight benefit it might produce by correcting an
occasional management mistake.” 324
I am not advocating for a complete Chicago School approach where the sole
consideration of the court would be the maximization of consumer welfare. 325 The
Supreme Court should consider other factors, such as the nature of the final
product and the marketplace. However, if the Supreme Court is going to base its
decision solely on consumer welfare, it should designate the NFL as a single
entity.
3. The Supreme Court Should Apply Copperweld Expansively and
Give Little Consideration to Lower Court Rulings on Single
Entity.
The fact that lower courts have expanded Copperweld, as the NFL in
American Needle contends, beyond the parent-subsidiary relationship to affiliated
companies or individuals should serve as an indication to the Supreme Court that
Copperweld’s narrow holding, as it applies to wholly-owned subsidiaries, is
capable of expansion. Grauer contends that there is dicta in Copperweld that
indicates there are other joint activities that might not have the requisite plurality
of actors necessary to sustain a section 1 claim. 326 Moreover, the true reason that
the Supreme Court should expand Copperweld is that, as previously noted, the
decision is excessively narrow. It is virtually impossible to obtain a complete unity
of interest, even within a single firm; as such, the Court should consider unity of
interest as a factor but, as Bulls II did, not require it of a single entity. 327
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The Supreme Court should ignore the progression of circuit and district court
cases dealing with single entity application to sports leagues. It is time to bring
some consistency to this area of law. There is simply too much uncertainty, and
that uncertainty leads to costly litigation and forum shopping. The NFL in
American Needle is actually the respondent but was in favor of the Court granting
because it wants the matter put to rest.. 328 Though Bulls II issues a favorable
ruling for the NFL, and the NFL cites it throughout its brief, the case still
advocates individually analyzing each facet of each league. Such an analysis is
costly and would not halt this endless stream of litigation. 329
This “one facet of one league at a time” analysis does not distinguish Bulls
II; rather, Bulls II is not different from all the courts who bemoan the complexity
of the issue. Bulls II once again points out that the leagues exhibit characteristics
of joint ventures and single entities and then essentially punts by only issuing the
narrowest of holdings. These types of decisions do nothing to further the field of
antitrust law and its application to major enterprises generating billions of dollars
each year.
D. Final Conclusion and Suggestion
I believe that the Supreme Court should consider the factors and issues
presented in this Article and issue a general holding, stating once and for all that
the NFL is a single entity and not subject to section 1 liability for its internal
decisions, such as the licensing of its trademarks. Though the NFL is a
conglomeration of thirty-two teams, it certainly produces its own unique product
that is greater than the sum of its parts. Moreover, Grauer and Roberts make
persuasive arguments in favor of letting enterprises like the NFL operate on their
own, employing a long-term application of the consumer welfare doctrine. Finally,
there is room for an expansive reading of Copperweld such that the Court could
expand single entity status to sports leagues, specifically the NFL.
Although this is what should happen, I do not believe it will. I believe that,
based on its hint in Brown, 330 the Court will rule in favor of the NFL. 331 However,
I believe that the Court will likely have trouble granting a sweeping single entity
designation to the NFL. Instead, I think that the Court will follow behind Bulls II
and find that this facet of the league is operating as a single entity. Namely, the
decision of the NFL to grant an exclusive merchandise license is one made by a
single entity, not a joint venture.
The Court will likely encounter the same struggles that all others have: the
NFL and all sports leagues exhibit signs of both joint ventures and single entities.
I also think that the Court will fall victim, at least partially, to the immunity
argument that any sweeping designation would ignore certain illegal activities that
surely would be found as such under a rule of reason analysis. This will probably
328
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prevent the Court from issuing a sweeping ruling that the NFL is a single entity for
antitrust purposes.
Should my predictions prove correct, the Court will have done very little to
bring any sort of finality to this issue. As such, the only proper course of action for
the NFL will be to seek refuge in Congress. If the Court comes down as I suspect,
seeking legislation exempting it from antitrust liability might make the most sense
for the NFL.

